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Masters of Disasters? An Empirical analysis of how Societies Benefit from 
Corporate Disaster Aid  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Corporations have become increasingly influential within societies around the world, while the 
relative capacity of national governments to meet large social needs has waned. Consequentially, 
firms are being asked to adopt responsibilities that have traditionally fallen to governments, aid 
agencies, and other types of organizations. There are questions, though, about whether or not this 
is beneficial for society. We study this in the context of disaster relief and recovery; an area 
where companies account for a growing share of aid as compared to traditional providers. 
Drawing on the dynamic capabilities literature, we argue that firms are better-equipped than 
other types of organizations to sense areas of need following a disaster, seize response 
opportunities, and reconfigure resources for fast, effective relief efforts. As such, we predict 
that—while traditional aid providers are important for disaster recovery—relief will arrive faster, 
and nations will recover more fully when locally active firms account for a larger share of 
disaster aid. We test our predictions with a proprietary dataset comprising information on every 
natural disaster and reported aid donation worldwide from 2003 to 2013. Our analysis uses a 
novel, quasi-experimental technique known as the synthetic control method and shows that 
nations benefit greatly from corporate involvement when disaster strikes.       
 
 
Keywords: corporate disaster giving, corporate social responsibility, disaster relief and 
recovery, international aid, synthetic control method  
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Globalization and the advance of neoliberal economic policies have made it more 
difficult for nations to regulate their economies and provide for their citizens, while bolstering 
the power and influence of corporations therein (Matten & Crane, 2005; Palazzo & Scherer, 
2008). One consequence of this is that firms are being relied upon to adopt responsibilities that 
have traditionally fallen to governments, aid agencies, and non-governmental organizations. 
Industry self-regulation increasingly substitutes for standards that governments are unable or 
unwilling to enforce (Ostrom, 2000; Potoski & Prakash, 2005); companies provide public goods 
by building hospitals, schools, and community projects (Palazzo & Scherer, 2008); and many 
firms contribute to infrastructure reconstruction efforts after natural disasters (Wassenhove, 
Tomasini, & Stapleton, 2008). Scholars have begun to examine when and why firms engage in 
these unique forms of social responsibility (CSR) (Crilly, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) and 
how they might benefit from doing so (Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2013; Madsen & Rodgers, 
2014). Yet, as with the broader CSR literature, we know little about societal outcomes and 
opinions are divided as to whether or not social welfare benefits should be expected.  
Proponents view CSR as intrinsically good for society. This can be seen in studies that 
recognize firms may be strategic with their CSR (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011), but consider it 
positive they are expanding their social responsibility repertoires to include the creation of public 
goods (see Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). However, this work stops short of assessing the extent to 
which these practices actually benefit society. Industry self-regulation studies have adopted a 
similar focus, examining how standards are created (Bartley, 2007) and when they lead to better 
corporate environmental performance (King & Lenox, 2000; Potoski & Prakash, 2005). Yet this 
work is limited to harm reduction, versus welfare enhancement, and ecological outcomes are 
assumed rather than shown.         
Taking another view, critics have argued that these forms of CSR do little to benefit 
society because firms use them primarily to secure government favors, forestall activism, and 
mollify local communities (Banerjee, 2008). This is supported by evidence that CSR is often 
3 
  
symbolic or political, and that firms make little effort to understand or effectively respond to 
social and environmental problems (Marquis & Qian, 2013; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 
2015). As a result, CSR initiatives may be suboptimal, or even counterproductive, from a societal 
perspective (Cavallo & Daude, 2011). For instance, a study of resource-extraction firms in the 
developing world found that more than $500m of CSR spending yielded almost no social welfare 
benefits (Frynas, 2005). Similar anecdotes have led some to argue that, while companies have 
the potential to contribute to social welfare based on their resources and influence, this work is 
best left to organizations such as governments and aid agencies that specialize in these activities 
and can be held accountable for their pursuit (Frynas, 2005; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004).   
In short, we know little about the societal effects of CSR initiatives—particularly those 
related to the provision of public goods—and what we do know raises questions about the 
effectiveness of their contribution to social welfare. We also lack theory to predict when and why 
a firm’s actions will create meaningful social welfare benefits, or the conditions under which 
businesses might be better-able than other types of organizations to deliver such benefits. To this 
end, we suggest it is useful to consider the unique capabilities of corporations vis-à-vis other 
types of organizations, and the situations where these capabilities are likely to be deployed in 
ways that yield positive outcomes for society. We argue that disaster responses are one such 
area, and that the speed of emergency relief and the level of a nation's recovery will be greater 
when locally active corporations account for a greater portion of aid.  
Responding effectively to natural disasters is a grand and growing challenge worldwide. 
The inflation-adjusted cost of a typical disaster has sextupled in the last 40 years, but the level of 
aid from traditional responders such as governments and aid agencies has been stagnant 
(Becerra, Cavallo, & Noy, 2014). Firms are increasingly called upon to address this gap, and 
have emerged in the past 25 years as a large contributor to disaster relief (White & Lang, 2012). 
While these contributions undoubtedly supplement the efforts of traditional aid providers, we 
argue that corporate involvement may also create unique benefits for a disaster-afflicted country.   
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To account for this, we develop a theoretical model based on insights from the dynamic 
capabilities literature (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Studies in this milieu examine how firms 
sense threats in the external environment, seize response opportunities, and reconfigure routines 
and resources to do so (Teece, 2007). Typically, this is used to explain firm-level performance 
differences. However, there is also evidence that dynamic capabilities differ systemically among 
organizations with different forms (Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Building on this, we argue that 
corporations—as compared to other types of organizations that give disaster aid—have dynamic 
capabilities that enable them to more effectively sense areas of critical need following a disaster, 
make fast decisions, and reconfigure resources for efficient, effective responses. As such, we 
predict that aid will arrive more quickly, and a nation will recover more fully, when locally 
active firms account for a larger share of disaster aid. We further argue that these outcomes will 
be enhanced when disaster giving leverages firm-specific routines and resources. 
We test our arguments with a proprietary dataset comprising all reported contributions 
from firms, governments, and aid agencies to relief efforts following every major natural 
disaster in the world from 2003 to 2013. To isolate the effect of corporate aid on our outcomes 
of interest, we use the synthetic control method (SCM) (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 
2015). The method is similar to other matching techniques often used in organizational research. 
Rather than matching treated entities with a single member of the control group, though, SCM 
constructs comparison units based on a combination of multiple entities: a synthetic control. The 
approach can thus be applied in contexts where it is hard to find suitable single comparisons, 
either because analysis focuses on aggregate entities like nations, or because the pool of 
potential controls is small (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2010). This is useful for us 
because our analysis requires a comparison of nations that have similar attributes and are 
afflicted by similar disasters, but receive different levels of corporate aid. 
Results support our hypotheses and suggest that disaster aid from locally active firms is 
not only socially beneficial, but also creates value beyond that provided by other entities. As 
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such, we demonstrate societal benefits of CSR and identify factors that generate and enhance 
positive outcomes. This addresses a weak spot in the CSR literature and complements firm-level 
studies by suggesting that, at least in the context of disaster aid, strategic CSR may indeed be a 
win-win proposition (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011). The social impact of CSR is also a metric 
that is increasingly demanded by stakeholders such as customers and governments (Eccles, 
Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014); we provide a way to show this using unambiguous measures. Our 
study also has policy implications. Disaster costs have grown at a pace that far exceeds the real 
value of traditional relief funding. Closing the gap is not only a matter of giving more, but 
giving more efficiently (United Nations, 2015; 2016). We illuminate conditions and mechanisms 
under which the business community can contribute to this goal in disaster responses. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Disasters and the Rise of Corporate Responses  
Nations face significant challenges in the aftermath of disasters. Earthquakes, floods, 
hurricanes and other calamities destroy infrastructure, cause human suffering, and are a source 
of negative economic growth that can take years to recover from (von Peter, von Dahlen, & 
Saxena, 2012). A typical large disaster causes a 20% reduction in national GDP (Barro, 2007), 
and the annual inflation-adjusted loss from even average disasters has grown from $54 billion in 
1980 to over $314 billion in 2015 (United Nations, 2016). Disasters are also underinsured, even 
in developed nations (Bevere, Orwig, & Sharan, 2015). As a result, there is a growing gap 
between the scale of disasters and the capacity of traditional aid providers, such as governments 
and multilateral agencies, to undertake effective responses (United Nations, 2016). 
As with other areas of CSR, the diminished capacity of traditional actors has led to 
growing calls for firms to be involved in disaster relief and recovery (Matten & Crane, 2005; 
Twigg, 2001; United Nations, 2015). Reflecting this, there has been a large increase in corporate 
disaster giving over the past 15 years. More than 90 percent of the world’s 2000 largest firms 
now participate in relief efforts each year, and their average inflation-adjusted donation has 
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grown by over 10 times to $1.6 million (Ballesteros, 2015).
1
 Corporate giving also comprises a 
growing share of all disaster aid, and in some cases exceeds the contributions of traditional 
providers (Ballesteros, 2015; White & Lang, 2012). For instance, in the aftermath of the 2010 
earthquake and tsunami in Chile, 55.4% of aid was from corporations; more than the combined 
amount provided by foreign governments and multilateral aid agencies. Similarly, 68.3% of the 
aid that Japan received after the 2011 tsunami was from firms, as was 51.7% of aid received by 
the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan (OCHA, 2016). 
Although corporate giving undoubtedly helps to address disaster funding gaps, we argue 
that such efforts are more than a supplement for traditional aid. We base this on the fact that the 
effectiveness of a disaster response is related to not just the quantity of aid, but also to the speed 
with which it arrives and the extent to which it addresses areas of critical need (Cutter, Emrich, 
Webb, & Morath, 2009; Klinenberg, 2003; Wassenhove et al., 2008). Following a disaster, 
resources can be directed to many different areas, with the implication that allocations may 
create logistical clogs in the disaster zone, not match the emergency at hand, or focus in areas 
that do not contribute to a nation’s long-run recovery. There is also evidence that the damage and 
suffering caused by a disaster is inversely related to the speed that aid reaches beneficiaries 
(DeLeo, 2013; Wassenhove et al., 2008). To wit, disaster recovery is significantly affected by the 
fast delivery of essential resources, such as food, water, and medicine, as well as the quick 
restoration of communication and transportation infrastructure (Day, Junglas, & Silva, 2009; 
Day, Melnyk, Larson, Davis, & Whybark, 2012). The slow response to Hurricane Katrina is a 
case in point: harm from the storm’s physical destruction was greatly compounded by the 
inability of Federal and local officials to respond quickly and adequately (Horowitz, 2008).  
                                                 
1
 The recent rise of corporate disaster giving is an expected consequence of firms’ strategic behavior. During the last 
thirty years, the number of firms with multinational operations and the number of foreign affiliates among the 
world’s largest companies grew three-fold and 10-fold, respectively. Given that exposure to disasters is higher for 
the average MNE than for single-country firms, the internationalization of economic activity has likely increased 
management attention to disaster risk.  
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In what follows, we develop a theoretical framework which predicts that corporations 
that have an active economic presence in a disaster-affected nation are uniquely well-suited to 
undertake fast and effective responses, and that their involvement thus contributes to more 
socially beneficial relief and recovery efforts.
2
 
Dynamic Capabilities and the Advantage of Locally Active Firms in Disaster Response 
Our approach for theorizing about the social value of corporate disaster giving is based 
on the dynamic capabilities literature. This research studies how organizations identify threats 
and opportunities in the external environment and reconfigure their routines and resources to 
undertake strategic responses (Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997). The core insight is that 
performance differences—especially in rapidly changing and uncertain environments—arise 
from the varied dynamic capabilities of different organizations (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). 
Recent work has also used this approach to explain variance in the strategic CSR of different 
companies (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). While most studies have been at the firm-level, there is 
also evidence that dynamic capabilities differ systematically among organizational forms, which 
are groups of entities that share common distinguishing features (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; 
Romanelli, 1991). This has been shown in cross-sectional research on firms with different 
governance structures (Hedlund, 1994), and in studies that examine how strategic behavior 
changes when a company switches forms (Lampel & Shamsie, 2003; Rindova & Kotha, 2001). 
Studies have also observed systematic differences in the governance structures, goals, and 
decision-making processes of businesses, charities, and government agencies as distinct 
organization forms (Cobb, Wry, & Zhao, 2016; Lee, Battilana, & Wang, 2014).  
Building on this, we argue that corporations—as compared to other organizational forms 
such as government agencies and multilateral aid providers—are likely to have capabilities that 
enable fast and effective disaster responses. Following Teece (2007), we decompose dynamic 
                                                 
2
 We define local presence based on a company having an affiliate or subsidiary that creates products or performs 
services in a focal nation. 
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capabilities into sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring components, and argue that firms with a 
presence in a disaster-afflicted nation are well suited to 1) sense threats and diagnose areas of 
critical need following a disaster, 2) seize upon opportunities to respond, and 3) quickly 
reconfigure routines and resources to do so effectively. We suggest that, collectively, these 
factors will lead to a nation receiving aid more quickly, and recovering more completely, when 
locally active firms account for a greater share of total disaster relief.  
 Sensing areas of need. As with rapidly changing competitive environments, the 
aftermath of a disaster is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and urgency (Baker & 
Bloom, 2013; Day et al., 2012). In such contexts, the first step for organizations in determining 
how to respond is to sense and interpret the situation at hand (Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 
2009; Teece et al., 1997). This entails scanning the environment and gathering data that can be 
used to inform strategic decision-making. In this regard, effective sensing capabilities yield 
diverse, accurate, and nuanced information, and thus support a robust understanding of threats 
and opportunities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015).  
The most immediate way that a firm is likely to sense a disaster is through its effects on 
local operations. The destruction of physical infrastructure directly affects the production and 
distribution of goods, while the human toll of a disaster affects employees and the functioning of 
local markets. Firms are likely to be sensitive to such disruptions because they are expeienced 
directly, and interpret them as areas of need because they have obvious financial implications 
(Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Indeed, studies have shown that in the 
aftermath of a disaster, locally active firms often rebuild transportation infrastructure to restore 
distribution and supply channels, construct housing and health facilities to bring normalcy to 
customers and employees, and make direct transfers to disaster victims to restore purchasing 
power (Ballesteros, 2013). This aligns with strategic CSR arguments that predict companies will 
act in the public good when doing so serves their own interests (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011). 
Broadly speaking, firms are likely to sense disaster impacts that threaten their market 
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performance and view these as requiring immediate responses (Horwitz, 2009). Discussing this, 
a Coca-Cola manager explained her firm’s response to the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in 
Japan by saying: “We are part of a system. If the government cannot [respond effectively], we 
need to rebuild. We need the market to recover.”3 
Further, to the extent that decisions about how to respond to market disruptions are best 
made when informed by nuanced and diverse information (Teece et al., 1997), companies are 
likely to benefit from relationships developed through their operations in a country. There is 
evidence that firms utilize local grass-roots relationships, affiliate networks, and partner 
organizations to help assess the damages caused by a disaster and to determine where aid is most 
urgently needed and will have the greatest impact (Useem, Kunreuther, & Michel-Kerjan, 2015). 
Having employees and other stakeholders present in the disaster zone may also enable a firm to 
gather to contextualized information about disaster impacts, and understand the needs and 
preferences of local communities (Horowitz, 2008). Thus, just as having ‘boots on the ground’ 
aids a firm in making sense of complex and uncertain competitive environments (Teece et al., 
1997), local operations offer a close-up look at the nature and scale of disaster impacts, and can 
thus help with sensing areas of critical need.  
By comparison, non-local governments and multilateral aid agencies usually do not have  
significant established infrastructure or contact networks in a disaster zone (Cohen & Werker, 
2008). As a result, the information that guides response planning for these organizations is more 
likely to be second-hand and from fewer sources. This may create challenges for sensing disaster 
impacts as well as confusion about how and where to best intervene. Indeed, a lack of local 
understanding has been cited as a key factor in the insufficient and misguided response from 
FEMA and other Washington, D.C. based aid providers following Hurricane Katrina (Horwitz, 
2009). The same issue is made vivid in the account of a municipal official in Chile’s Maule 
region, which was devastated in 2010 by an earthquake and tsunami:  
                                                 
3
 Manager, International Public Affairs, Coca-Cola Company: interview with the first author.  
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The government disappeared… and when they arrived, they did not know exactly what to 
do, how to coordinate the aid, what functions to perform… we coped with it with our 
own resources and with a lot of help from the private sector.” (Polanco, 2012).  
There is also evidence that, whereas a firm’s fiduciary interests contribute to a focus on 
economically relevant disaster impacts (Ballesteros, 2015), traditional aid providers often 
confront multiple pressures and preferences that shape how they interpret information coming 
from a disaster zone. For governments, decisions about how to intervene following a disaster 
may be guided by political factors (Reeves, 2011). Indeed, studies have shown that up to 50 
percent of the variance in disaster relief allocations is explained by electoral considerations 
(Garrett & Sobel, 2004). Foreign governments also tend to be more attuned to disasters that 
affect political allies, culturally similar nations, and oil-exporting countries (Fink & Redaelli, 
2011). There is also evidence that the amount of aid pledged by governments, NGOs, and 
multilateral agencies is influenced by the level of media coverage that a disaster receives, 
irrespective of its actual impacts (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Franks, 2013). In sum, the 
capability of these organizations to sense areas of critical need following a disaster is often 
constrained by political considerations and special-interest pressures, rather than being guided 
by assessments of need and impact alone (Cohen & Werker, 2008; Platt, 2012).  
The above considerations support the argument that locally active companies are more 
likely than traditional aid providers to sense and accurately interpret information about disaster 
impacts that relate to a nation’s economic functioning. In turn, this should motivate responses 
that focus on rebuilding key infrastructure and restoring the market status quo. Importantly, 
there is evidence that such initiatives have a positive effect on national growth and social 
welfare: in comparison, the less focused and politically motivated initiatives undertaken by 
governments and aid agencies have been shown to generate less social surplus (Cavallo & 
Daude, 2008; Khan & Kumar, 1997; Robinson & Torvik, 2005). For instance, in a sample of 24 
countires, Khan and Reinhart (1990) found that public investments had an overall negative 
influence on economic growth, whereas private investment had a significant positive effect.   
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Seizing opportunities to act. Once an organization has sensed disaster impacts and come 
to an understanding of where to intervene, the next step is to seize the opportunity to act (Teece, 
2007). As with other strategic decisions, the speed with which action takes place has significant 
implications for the effectiveness of disaster relief and recovery (Day et al., 2012; Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000). In this regard, dynamic capabilities research shows that local autonomy and 
decentralized decision-making enhance the speed and effectiveness with which a firm can 
respond to threats and opportunities in the external environment (Teece et al., 1997). Extending 
this to disaster relief, we argue that locally active companies will likely have a speed advantage 
over other types of aid providers.  
When a firm is motivated to restore market functioning in a nation, it can delegate 
decisions about aid allocation to managers whose local knowledge and situational proximity are 
conducive to the agility and improvisation required for quick and effective action in complex 
environments (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007). In comparison, governments and multilateral aid 
agencies often have centralized, bureaucratic decision-making processes which can impede rapid 
action (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Hence, when a disaster requires donors to swiftly ramp-up 
their engagement, firms likely face fewer decision-making constraints than other aid providers 
(White & Lang, 2012). For example, following the 2010 Chile disaster, multi-national mining 
firm, Anglo American, relied on local managers to assess damages and lead its response. Just 
hours after the earthquake, the company’s London-based headquarters was briefed on the 
destruction and authorized managers to respond. The result was one of the first major relief and 
recovery donations from any source (Useem et al., 2015).  
Reconfiguring and the effective provision of aid. In addition to decision-making speed, 
locally active companies are also likely to have resources and routines that can be quickly 
reconfigured for disaster relief (Teece, 2007). With regard to resources, the cash position of 
most large firms allows them to purchase response goods or transfer money to victims (Matten 
& Crane, 2005). Productive assets within an affected country can also be repurposed to address 
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disaster needs, such as when Anglo American rapidly dispatched heavy equipment from its 
mining operations to gather debris and remove rockslides after the Chile earthquake (Useem et 
al., 2015). Similarly, following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, handset manufacturer, Ericsson, 
moved quickly to provide mobile phones to help disaster responders. Large firms also have the 
ability to smoothly redeploy resources from across their network of corporate affiliates (Teece, 
2014). This contributes to a broader and more diverse resource base that can be deployed at 
speed to support relief efforts. For instance, Wal-Mart and other large retailers were able to 
mobilize inventory from across their subsidiary networks to bolster the supply of medicines, 
food, and clean-up supplies following Hurricane Katrina (Horwitz, 2009).  
Routines and competencies that a company has developed for business purposes can also 
be utilized to implement fast, effective relief efforts (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Following the 
Indian Ocean tsunami, for example, industrial companies helped rebuild schools by drawing on 
their experience with large-scale engineering projects. These firms had no history building 
schools, but ample expertise with construction materials and methods. Coordinating with makers 
of mobile buildings, they quickly built state-of-the-art, earthquake-proof schoolhouse structures 
(Fernando, 2010). In another example, the logistics company, TNT, assisted the United Nations 
in designing relief warehouses in Italy by using its expertize to help optimize warehouse storage 
and to train personnel in inventory management: the result was an estimated $450,000 reduction 
in annual operating costs (Wassenhove et al., 2008).   
In comparison, the centralization and bureaucracy that often slows decision-making in 
governments and multilateral agencies can create barriers to efficient and effective aid 
deployment. Unlike companies that already have resources in a nation, these organizations 
typically need to marshal resources and put local infrastructure into place before a response can 
begin (Cohen & Werker, 2008; Lipscy & Takinami, 2013). In addition to slowing the flow of 
aid, it is costly to create new structures and routines, and there are often kinks to be worked out 
before operations become smooth (Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014; Teece et al., 1997). The need to 
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navigate layers of bureaucracy may also contribute to bottlenecks that slow the dispersion of 
disaster relief (Fritz, 2004). Indeed, nearly 40% of the aid pledged by foreign governments and 
aid agencies following the 2010 Haiti earthquake was still outstanding in 2013, whereas all 
corporate aid had been distributed (Ballesteros, 2015; Becerra, Cavallo, & Noy, 2013).  
Without discounting the importance of traditional aid providers for effective disaster 
relief, our collected arguments suggest that firms have capabilities that are uniquely well-suited 
to fast and effective responses. In turn, this should contribute to positive outcomes for afflicted 
nations when corporations account for a larger share of disaster relief. Formally, we predict:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The speed with which aid is provided to a disaster-affected nation 
will be faster when locally active corporations account for a greater share of total disaster aid.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The long-term recovery of a disaster-affected nation will be greater 
when locally active corporations account for a greater share of total disaster aid.   
The value of firm-specific versus general resources. While we expect that corporations 
as an organizational form have a comparative advantage in delivering fast and effective aid 
following a disaster, there is undoubtedly variance in the degree to which responses fit with the 
need being addressed (Kogut & Zander, 1992). For instance, even at a high level of analysis, 
there is likely to be a difference in the speed and effectiveness of responses that draw on firm 
specific versus general routines and resources. According to the dynamic capabilities literature, 
firms work to develop areas of core expertise around co-specialized routines and resources, 
which they then look to deploy in response to environmental shifts (Kogut & Zander, 1992; 
Teece, 2014). Mirroring the general finding that firms perform better when they are able to 
leverage such competencies, research on strategic CSR has shown that companies are more 
disciplined with their giving when it is consistent with business objectives (Porter & Kramer, 
2002; Saiia et al., 2003), and that CSR that is related to core business competencies is more 
likely to produce financial benefits for the firm (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Extending this to 
societal outcomes, Kaul and Luo (forthcoming) developed a theoretical proof that suggests 
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related CSR contributes to social welfare more efficiently than comparable government or 
charity initiatives.   
Applied to disaster response, this points to a distinction between firms that respond with 
general resources—such as donating money to relief efforts—versus those that respond by 
reconfiguring areas of core expertise. Financial donations undoubtedly make a valuable 
contribution to disaster relief, but they also insert a layer between the firm and aid 
implementation, while offering little additive value beyond the cash infusion. This may 
contribute to a relatively slower and less effective response. In comparison, leveraging areas of 
expertise has the potential to add unique value that contributes to the effectiveness of a relief 
effort without imposing major transactional or operational costs. Such efforts can also be 
undertaken quickly, as they draw on existing products or services and generally don’t require 
intermediaries for implementation.  
For instance, it stands to reason that the impact of disaster giving will be greater when a 
firm contributes resources that are similar to those it has expertise producing for private sale. For 
the firm, the marginal cost of providing such goods is relatively low, as significantly new skills 
and routines are not required for their production. Quality and speed of delivery should also be 
high, given the firm’s production competencies. In comparison, it will likely be costly for other 
entities—corporate or otherwise— to provide similar goods if they lack the relevant capabilities 
(Besley & Ghatak, 2007). The implication is that related CSR should be more efficient, cost 
effective, and high quality than other options.  
Illustrating this, in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Coca-Cola converted 
soft-drink production lines in Sri Lanka to bottle water, and used its own trucks to distribute the 
water to victims. In so doing, Coke was able to quickly produce and distribute an essential good 
in a cost efficient and effective manner (Fritz, 2004). Supporting this argument with formal 
models, Kotchen (2006) compared the provision of public goods that firms produced jointly 
with private goods, versus those that they produced separately. Results suggested there are 
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greater social welfare impacts in the first example because production integrates capabilities that 
are used to produce the private good: this affects the equilibrium provision of the public good. 
This effect is absent for unrelated giving, however, such as when a transport company donates 
food or a fraction of sales to disaster relief.  
Company-specific knowledge and routines may also be germane to disaster relief efforts. 
The types of expertise required for many aspects of disaster response—for instance, logistics, 
construction, and planning—have analogs in business (Wassenhove et al., 2008). Firms incur 
little cost when they contribute such expertise, yet this can have a meaningful effect on the speed 
with which aid reaches beneficiaries, as well as the effectiveness of a disaster response (Horwitz, 
2009). The actions of express delivery firm, DHL, offer a case in point. DHL often assumes a 
lead role in coordinating the reception and distribution of relief supplies after a disaster. By 
drawing on its competencies in rapid dispatch and inventory control, DHL’s involvement in 
disaster logistics regularly contributes to fewer donated goods going to waste and less airport 
congestion in the disaster-affected nation (Wassenhove et al., 2008). Similar outcomes were 
apparent when FedEx took a lead role coordinating the delivery of relief goods following the 
2008 floods in Mexico (Ballesteros, 2013). As such, we predict: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Aid from locally active corporations will have a greater effect on the 
speed with which aid is provided to a disaster-affected nation when this giving leverages firm-
specific routines and resources.    
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Aid from locally active corporations will have a greater effect on a 
nation’s recovery from disaster when this giving leverages firm-specific routines and resources.    
METHODS 
We tested our hypotheses with a dataset that covers every major natural disaster in the 
world from 2003 to 2013, as reported in the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT) from the 
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Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters.
4
 Whereas EM-DAT records all disasters, 
we restricted our analysis to sudden disasters, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, which have a 
clear triggering event, immediate disruption, and peak impacts within 30 days. We excluded 
slowly-emerging disasters, such as famines, because impacts unfold over a long period of time 
and it is difficult to identify the magnitude and timing of disaster responses. We also excluded 
human-caused disasters, such as 9/11, as these are often accompanied by social and political 
factors that affect the likelihood of receiving aid (Birkland, 1997; Klinenberg, 2003).  
Overall, there were 3,523 disaster-nation pairs in our analysis period (i.e., instances 
where a country was affected by a sudden natural disaster). Of these, we dropped 119 where the 
start- and end-dates of the disaster were imprecise, as well as 191 where peak impacts occurred 
outside of 30 days. We gathered information on the economic and human toll of each disaster 
using data provided by the company, Swiss Re, which tracks insured and uninsured disaster 
losses (Sigma, 2014), and from international-aid data provided by the United Nations Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Data on these variables were missing or incomplete for 
1,031 of the records in our dataset, which were dropped from our analysis.
 
This left us with 
2,084 discrete disaster-nation events that we used to test our predictions about the speed of aid 
provision (H1 and H3). For our analysis of post-disaster recovery (H2 and H4), we took into 
account that a nation may be affected by multiple disasters in the same year. In such cases, we 
added the damages for each disaster to create a collective annual disaster. This resulted in 464 
country-year disasters. Collectively, the disasters in our analysis affected over 836 million 
people in 129 countries and caused over $1.3 trillion in damage.  
For disaster aid, we built a propriety dataset with information on every donation that a 
nation received for 12 months following a disaster, and from what source (i.e., corporations, 
governments, and multilateral agencies). To do this, we began by searching Factiva and Lexis 
                                                 
4
 To register an event in the International Disaster Database, at least one of the following criteria must be fulfilled: 10 or more 
people killed, 100 or more people affected, a declaration of a state of emergency, or a call for international assistance. Further 
information can be accessed at http://www.emdat.be/.  
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Nexis for media reports with headlines that featured a combination of the affected country, the 
type of disaster, and—where relevant—the name of the disaster (e.g., Typhoon Haiyan).5 We 
then narrowed our sample to reports that contained information on disaster giving by searching 
for a Boolean combination of the term ‘donate’ as well as various derivations and synonyms. In 
total, this yielded 2,310,000 items which formed the core of our analysis. We used an automated 
coding process to search within each report for details about the type, financial value, date, and 
source of each donation. This yielded information on over 73,000 donations from more than 
34,000 corporations. For each donation, we coded those that were coming from corporations 
with local affiliates as reflected in the Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations Database. For each in-
kind donation, we recorded the characteristics of the product or service in question and 
converted this to a monetary figure based on current prices in the affected nation (as reported in 
the Billion Prices Project
6
), the monetary value reported by the donor, or the reported value of 
similar donations from other organizations. Donations were converted into U.S. dollars using the 
exchange rate on the date the gift was made.  
We elaborate on our search strategy, coding procedures, and validity checks in an online 
appendix at https://disastergiving.wordpress.com/.  
Estimation Strategy  
Our hypotheses focus on how corporate disaster giving affects the speed of aid provision 
and the level of disaster recovery in a nation following a sudden natural disaster. Given the 
impossibility of a clean experimental design where disaster-affected nations are randomly 
allocated into groups with different levels of corporate disaster giving and donation relatedness, 
we aim for the second-best econometric tool for causal inference: a quasi-experimental design. 
For our analysis, isolating causality requires an approach that compares relief and recovery 
among nations that receive different levels of corporate aid, but are otherwise similar with 
                                                 
5
 These databases cover newspapers, trade publications, magazines, newswires, press releases, television and radio 
transcripts, digital video and audio clips, corporate websites and reports, institutional websites and reports, and 
government websites and reports, among other sources. 
6
 http://bpp.mit.edu/.  
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regard to underlying attributes and disaster impacts. The assumption of heterogeneity in 
corporate disaster giving, but homogeneity in everything else, is difficult to satisfy and poses an 
estimation challenge for conventional panel-data techniques. To wit, nations may have 
capacities that are independent of corporate giving, but difficult to empirically isolate, such as 
variance in their ability to care for citizens and manage disaster responses. Failing to take these 
factors into account may lead to biased, inefficient estimates, or spurious causation.  
Tools such as country-specific fixed-effects and control variables can be used to help 
address these issues, but this imposes the assumption that ex ante disaster trends extrapolate to 
ex post conditions, which is often not the case, particularly over long time periods (Cavallo, 
Galiani, Noy, & Pantano, 2013). In comparison, traditional quasi-experimental designs, such as 
differences-in-differences, allow for the inclusion of unobserved confounding influences. These 
effects must be time-invariant, though, so that the temporal differences method can address 
them. Large sample inferential techniques like coarsened-exact matching are another way to deal 
with this issue. It is difficult to apply these techniques in contexts such as ours, however, 
because suitable single comparisons often do not exist for aggregate entities like nations (Abadie 
et al., 2010, 2015). The challenge is amplified when the number of potential control units or 
sample periods is small (Cavallo et al., 2013).  
Synthetic control method. Based on these considerations, we chose the synthetic control 
method (SCM) for our analysis, which is a quasi-experimental technique that overcomes some 
of the limitations of traditional matching approaches (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). As with other 
matching techniques, SCM matches a focal (treated) entity with a control that is statistically 
similar for a set of relevant predictors, but different with regard to a focal independent variable 
(the treatment). Comparison units are selected to reproduce the counterfactual for the focal 
entity, and thus isolate how treatment affects the outcome of interest. SCM is unique, though, in 
that controls are a combination of multiple potential comparators, rather than single entities.  
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The approach works by using an algorithm that, first, evaluates the capacity of every 
entity not affected by an intervention to emulate pre-treatment characteristics of the treated 
entity. From this, weights are assigned to multiple control entities, which are then combined to 
form a synthetic comparator that closely resembles the treated entity, except for the presence of 
the intervention (see Abadie et al., 2010, 2015 for detailed discussions). The approach is also 
capable of matching entities over a long pre-treatment time-period. As Abadie et al. (2015: 498) 
note, this effectively controls for unobserved variance, as “only units that are alike in observed 
and unobserved [factors]…should produce similar trajectories on the outcome variable over 
extended periods of time.” As applied to our analysis, this means that SCM matches each treated 
nation with a combination of carefully selected countries in the control group: a synthetically 
created nation. For instance, no one country approximates Chile in the years leading up to the 
2010 earthquake and tsunami. However, features of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, 
Brazil, Mexico, and the United States can be integrated in different proportions to form a 
synthetic Chile that is a close match on features that predict the speed of disaster relief as well as 
the nation’s historical levels of social welfare.7  
The efficiency of SCM centers on the capacity of the algorithm to minimize, for each 
pre-treatment period, the distance between treated entities and each of the control entities on a 
case-by-case basis. As a result, significance levels are not computed as in traditional panel-data 
techniques, and effect sizes are interpreted directly as the difference between the values for 
treated versus control entities on the outcome of interest (Abadie et al., 2015). The statistical 
likelihood that observed outcomes are the result of treatment versus chance is calculated using 
placebo tests. The approach works by telling the SCM algorithm that entities in the control 
group have received treatment (even though they have not). These ‘placebo’ entities are then 
matched with synthetic counterparts, and outcomes of interest are assessed. Repeating this 
                                                 
7
 Our online appendix shows how the SCM algorithm combines features of these nations to approximate 2010 Chile. 
See https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/synthetic-control-method.pdf. 
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analysis for all non-treated entities creates a distribution of outcomes that are essentially 
observed by chance. This distribution of false treatment effects is then used to compare with the 
actual treatment effects and generate p-values (see Abadie et al., 2015).  
Variable Definitions 
Outcome variables. Our analysis features two outcome variables: the speed of aid 
provision, and; a nation’s disaster recovery. As with previous studies of disaster management, 
we used the portion of total disaster aid provided in the four weeks following a disaster as a 
proxy for the speed of aid provision (Day et al., 2012; O’Donnell, 2009). We analyze a nation’s 
recovery from disaster based on the annual growth rate of its Human Development Index (HDI) 
score, which is a measure of aggregate social welfare (Anand & Sen, 1994). HDI is calculated 
annually by the United Nations Development Program and tracks a nation’s level of health and 
longevity, knowledge and education, and standard of living.   
Treatment variables and levels. For hypotheses 1 and 2, our treatment variable is the 
share of aid from locally active firms. We used the Lexis Nexis Directory of Corporate Affiliates 
to determine which firms were located, or had a subsidiary, in an affected country and were thus 
‘locally active’. Our variable is the amount of aid from these firms divided by the total amount 
of aid received by a nation in the year following a disaster. To test our hypotheses, we analyzed 
three levels of treatment. The distribution of corporate giving is highly skewed, which means 
that is not an efficiency strategy to select treatment levels based on the mean value and standard 
deviations. Instead, we use the 75
th
 (7.7% of aid is from locally active firms), 95
th
 (24.5%), and 
99
th
 (44.4%) percentiles as treatment levels (see Caravallo et al., 2013 for a similar approach).   
For hypotheses 3 and 4 we developed a measure of related giving that reflects the degree 
to which disaster aid leverages firm-specific routines or resources. To calculate this, we began 
by using a firm’s four-digit SIC code to identify its key business activities. We coded the dollar 
amount of in-kind donations that aligned with these activities as related [i.e., products, services, 
or activities that are relevant to the firm’s market operation (e.g., Bayer providing medicines in 
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response to Typhoon Haiyan)]. Details about how we coded related versus unrelated giving can 
be found at https://disastergiving.wordpress.com/. Our specific variable is the value of related 
aid divided by the total value of disaster aid from locally active firms. Again, we used three 
treatment levels in our analysis. As the distribution for relatedness is relatively normal, we used 
the mean (26.9% of corporate aid is in the form of related giving) and +/- one standard deviation 
(11.5% and 42.4%) for treatment indicators.  
Predictor variables. We created a synthetic counterpart for each treated nation using the 
STATA algorithm developed by Abadie et al. (2010). For all matching, we included a variable 
for the economic hardship caused by a disaster, as reflected in USD amount of damage to 
property, crops, and livestock reported by Swiss Re and EM-DAT. Beyond this, however, 
different predictors are relevant for the speed of aid provision versus a nation’s recovery from 
disaster (Day et al., 2012; Ray, 1998; Wassenhove et al., 2008). As such, we added different 
matching variables for these two analyses. 
Speed of aid provision. Studies of disaster management and corporate disaster giving 
have suggested that key predictors for aid speed include the size of a nation’s economy, it’s 
openness to aid, and the prominence of a disaster (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Stromberg, 
2007). To this end, we used the following predictors in our matching: 1) size of the economy, 
measured as the natural logarithm of a country’s pre-disaster GDP per capita (PPP); 2) human 
hardship, which is the natural logarithm of either the number of people killed or number of 
people affected, as reported by EM-DAT; 3) salience, measured with the natural logarithm of 
(one plus) the count of news articles in Factiva and Lexis Nexis that referred to the event in the 
48 hours after its occurrence; 4) newsworthy events, defined as the average of the median 
number of minutes that a news broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day over 
the forty days after the disaster (see Eisensee & Strömberg (2007) for an explanation of this 
indicator and a test of its effectiveness); 5) number of disasters at the country and 6) at the 
international level, which speaks to other events that may dilute the attention paid to a focal 
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disaster and; 7) openness to aid, which is a binary variable indicating the national government’s 
consent to receive foreign aid, as coded from articles in Factiva and Lexis Nexis.   
Disaster recovery. We chose predictors of disaster recovery based on their relevance to 
HDI as reflected in a voluminous literature on economic development and the social costs of 
disaster (cf., Barro, 2009; Cavallo et al., 2013; Kousky, 2013). These are: 1) schooling measured 
by secondary education attainment; 2) life expectancy at birth; 3) inflation rate as reflected in the 
annual percentage change for consumer prices; 4) trade openness proxied by real exports plus 
real imports as a percentage of real GDP; 5) investment rate, which is the ratio of real domestic 
private and public investment to real GDP. Data for these variables is from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI). For each treated nation, we constructed a synthetic control 
based on 15 years of pre-disaster data. For calculating disaster recovery, we followed nations for 
10 years and, thus, in some cases use forecast values for 2016 to 2023 as reported in the WDI.
8
  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics while Table 2 shows correlations.  
-----Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here------ 
RESULTS 
The Effect of Corporate Aid on Response Speed and Recovery from Disaster 
Table 3 shows results for hypothesis 1, which predicted that the speed of aid provision 
will be faster when locally active corporations account for a greater share of disaster aid. Models 
1-3 reflect the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% levels of the treatment variable, respectively. We 
observe similar average values for treatment and control groups on each predictor variable, 
which shows that our matching was effective. P-values were calculated using the placebo method 
discussed above.
9
 Results show that there is no significant difference in the speed of aid 
                                                 
8
 Some country-specific data were missing from the WDI, in such case, we applied the multiple-input bootstrapping 
algorithm for time-series-cross-sectional data as explained by Honaker et al. (2011). The online appendix provides a 
detailed description of the missing data, our approach and the relevant checks of accuracy and efficiency. See: 
https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/treatment-of-country-specific-missing-data.pdf.  
9
 The online appendix https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/inference-with-placebo-exercises.pdf 
provides details on the placebo tests that were used to support our analysis.  
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provision at 7.7% share of corporate giving in total aid. However, this changes dramatically as 
corporations comprise progressively larger shares of disaster giving. At the 24.5%, treated 
nations received 121% more aid during the first month as compared to synthetic counterfactuals. 
The effect is even greater when the share of corporate giving is above 44.4% of aid. Here, treated 
nations received more than twice the aid of synthetic control nations by the end of the fourth 
post-disaster week. Thus, while corporate giving has little effect on the speed of aid provision for 
most disasters (because firms comprise a relatively small share of aid in these instances), we 
observe that high levels of giving have a strong and significant effect that is consistent with our 
prediction in H1. Table 3 and Figure 1 show the average and the trajectory of the accumulated 
donation each post-disaster week for treatment and synthetic control groups.  
-----Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 about here----- 
Table 4 shows results for hypothesis 2, which predicted that the overall recovery of a 
nation will be greater when locally active corporations account for a larger share of disaster aid. 
Again, models reflect different levels of the treatment variable, and report average values for 
treatment and control groups on each predictor. The outcome variable is the annual growth rate 
of HDI 10 post-disaster years. We observe a significant difference between HDI growth rate for 
treatment and control groups when locally active firms account for more than 24.5% of disaster 
aid. The result is stronger when firms contribute more than 44.4% of all aid. However, we do not 
observe a significant effect on social welfare when the share of corporate disaster aid equals, or 
is lower than, 7.7%, suggesting that positive effects only become apparent when corporations 
play an outsized role in a disaster response.     
Figure 2 shows the trajectory of change in the annual growth rate between treated and 
control nations. Given that the SCM algorithm generates the synthetic controls based on the pre-
disaster history of the predictors of HDI, we expect no significant differences before the disaster. 
Accordingly, we observe the differences in the HDI growth rate only during the 10 post-disaster 
years. Results show that the level of recovery after 10 years is notably higher for countries that 
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receive over 24.5% of disaster aid from locally active firms. On average, the HDI growth rate for 
such nations is 92% higher than for their synthetic controls: this gap grows to 145.5% at the 
44.4% of share of corporate giving. As such, our results suggest a slight decrease in the positive 
effect on HDI at higher levels of corporate giving. Hence, we find support for hypothesis 2, but 
note that our results suggest that corporate involvement is not panacea for disaster responses, and 
that a nation’s long-term recovery likely benefits from the participation of other entities.  
-----Insert Table 4 and Figure 2 about here----- 
The Value of Firm-Specific versus General Resources 
Regarding our last two hypotheses, we found that the positive effect of corporate aid on 
the speed of aid provision and a nation’s recovery from disaster becomes greater when the 
portion of this giving that is related to firms’ core business increases. To analyze this, we 
examined the effects of relatedness (i.e., 11.5%, 26.9%, and 42.4%) at each treatment level of 
corporate giving (i.e., 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4%). Table 5 reports the results for hypothesis 3, 
which focuses on the effects of related giving on the speed of aid. We observe that increases in 
relatedness lead to significantly faster aid provision when the share of giving from locally active 
firms is at least 24.5% of total aid. For instance, at 95
th
 percentile of share of corporate giving 
and 7.7% of relatedness, treated nations receive aid 170% faster than counterfactual nations; at 
44.4% of share of corporate giving and 42.4% relatedness, nations receive aid 260% faster than 
control nations. In other words, the marginal effect on relief speed increases with the share of 
related corporate giving. Figure 3 plots the trajectory of accumulated aid for each post-disaster 
week for the cases of a nation with at least 24.5% of aid coming from locally active firms and 
11.4% of relatedness; and one receiving 44.4% and 42.4% respectively. In sum, these effects 
suggest a strong case for hypothesis 3.  
-----Insert Table 5 and Figure 3 about here----- 
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We followed the same procedure for hypothesis 4, which predicted that a nation’s 
recovery from disaster will be stronger when a greater portion of corporate aid comes in the form 
of related giving. Table 6 reports the treatment effect of relatedness on the growth rate of HDI at 
each level of corporate aid and shows that it has a consistently positive and significant influence. 
Of particular note, we observe that the greatest average difference between treated and control 
nations occurs when there are high levels of corporate aid (44.4% share in aid) and a large 
portion of this aid comprises related giving (42.4%). Ten years after a disaster, the average HDI 
annual growth rate for such nations is expected to be almost 190% greater than for comparators. 
To show the magnitude of the role of relatedness in the effect of corporate giving on HDI, we 
compare in Figure 4 the trajectory of the annual growth of HDI between two similar treated 
nations and their control nations. When relatedness is not considered, the difference between 
treated and synthetic controls is 56 percentage points lower. As such, we find strong support for 
hypothesis 4.      
-----Insert Table 6 and Figure 4 about here----- 
Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analyses  
We ran a variety of supplementary models and robustness checks to deepen our analysis 
and bolster our findings. All results are available to view in our online appendix at 
https://disastergiving.wordpress.com/.  
Alternate modeling approach. Although SCM allows us to cleanly identify the effect of 
corporate aid on the speed of aid provision and the level of recovery following a disaster, we 
conducted additional analyses using traditional regression techniques. While there are limits to 
this type of approach in contexts like ours—namely that they do an inefficient job of accounting 
for unobserved heterogeneity—consistent results would add support to our findings, while 
offering insight into the influence of our treatment variables across a broader range of values.  
To this end, we ran OLS regressions: country-level fixed-effects were used to control for 
time-invariant unobserved factors, and a variety of country-, disaster-, and time-specific 
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variables were used to control for time-variant effects. A description of these variables, as well 
as their sources and definitions, is provided in our online appendix. To enhance the econometric 
efficiency of these estimates, we also applied coarsened-exact matching (CEM) (Iacus, King, & 
Porro, 2008, 2011). The rationale for using CEM is that it provides a way to deal with 
unobserved variance in country-specific capacities to manage disasters and enhance HDI over 
time. To conduct the matching, and balance baseline nation-specific factors between treatment 
and the control groups, we used the same predictors as in our SCM analysis. As discussed, 
however, the ability of CEM to produce efficient estimates drops considerably when the number 
of available comparison entities or periods is low, in addition to its comparative disadvantage 
vis-à-vis the SCM to account for the aggregate nature of nations. 
Results of this analysis were consistent with our reported models. We found that a one 
standard deviation increase in the share of giving from locally active firms resulted in a 230% 
increase in the portion of aid that arrived during the first four weeks after a disaster, as well as a 
37.2% increase in HDI growth rate. The magnitude of these impacts increases 36% and 29.2%, 
respectively, for every standard deviation increase in the degree of relatedness of giving.  
Alternate dependent variable. In our main analysis, we modelled a nation’s recovery 
from disaster using its HDI annual growth rate, as this provides a measure of aggregate social 
welfare. Our arguments suggest, however, that the disaster response efforts of locally active 
firms are likely to center around restoring market functions and economic infrastructure. If this is 
correct, we would expect to see increases in economic as well as social indicators when 
corporations account for a greater portion of disaster aid. To test this, we replicated our analysis 
using a nation’s annual growth rate of GDP in place of the correspondent rate for HDI. This 
exercise replicated the significance and direction of our main findings. Aid from locally active 
firms strongly affects a nation’s economic recovery from disaster. When locally active firms 
account for at least 44.4% of total aid, GDP growth for treated nations is twice that of control 
nations. This adds further support to our theoretical arguments. It also aligns with literature on 
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the economic costs of disasters (Kousky, 2013) as well as work that show private investment has 
a larger effect than public investment on economic development (Khan & Kumar, 1997).    
The influence of locally active vs. other firms.  Another key feature of our argument is 
that it predicts locally active firms will have dynamic capabilities that enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of disaster response. Thus, while disaster aid may also come from firms that do not 
have a presence in an afflicted nation, we excluded these from our main analysis. If aid from 
outside firms has a similar effect to what we observed for locally active companies, this would 
cast doubt on the validity of our theory. While the ideal way to check for this would be to 
replicate our analysis of giving from locally active firms with an analysis of distant firms, there 
are not enough cases to support a meaningful comparative analysis: very few nations receive 
24.5% (let alone 44.4%) of aid from distant firms. As the next best option, we selected a binary 
treatment level of 49.9% or more of aid from locally active firms. We see non-significant effects 
when locally active firms comprise the minority of corporate giving. This supports our argument 
that the dynamic capabilities relevant for effective disaster responses are related to having a local 
presence in the affected nation.    
The effect of institutional development. One may argue that the underlying quality of 
national institutions may drive the efficiency of corporate disaster giving. Countries with more 
developed institutions may be more ready to absorb, manage, and account for aid flows. Less 
corruption and higher accountability may also increase the willingness of firms to donate. 
Further, government effectiveness should be associated with a stronger capacity to match relief 
aid with victim needs. Although our SCM algorithms matched nations on several institutional 
variables, we took an additional step to evaluate the potential influence of local institutions on 
the speed and effectiveness of aid from locally active companies. Specifically, we stratified the 
application of the synthetic case algorithm by government effectiveness—which is a measure 
from the WDI that reflects perceptions about the quality of public services, the civil service and 
its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
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and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies—using the discussed 
percentiles as cutoff values. We did not use lower percentiles because the number of available 
disaster countries with which to generate synthetic controls was insufficient. We did not find 
significant differences in the effect of corporate giving on disaster recovery across these groups 
(see https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/). This is consistent with studies of emergency 
international assistance that have found no evidence that policy effectiveness or capacity to 
implement aid affects donation magnitude (Olsen, Carstensen, & Høyen, 2003).  
DISCUSSION 
Globalization and the advance of neoliberal policies have made it more difficult for 
nations to ensure the welfare of their citizens, while simultaneously giving more power to the 
corporations therein (Frynas, 2005; Matten & Crane, 2005). As a result, companies are being 
called upon to adopt responsibilities that have traditionally fallen to governments, multilateral 
agencies, and NGOs. Scholars have made a number of inroads with regard to describing these 
practices (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), and have begun to make predictions 
about when firms will adopt them, and with what consequences (Henisz et al., 2014; Prakash & 
Potoski, 2007). Yet, as with the broader CSR literature, societal outcomes have been largely 
overlooked (Frynas, 2005; Margolis et al., 2007). We also lack theory to predict when and why a 
firm’s actions will create meaningful social welfare benefits, or the conditions under which 
businesses might be better-able than other types of organizations to deliver such benefits.   
We examined these issues in the context of sudden natural disasters; an area where there 
are growing calls for corporations to help address the insufficient response capacity of traditional 
aid providers (United Nations, 2016). To make predictions about the effects of corporate aid, we 
developed a theoretical framework based on the dynamic capabilities literature (Teece, 2007). 
We argued that nations will benefit when locally active firms account for a larger share of 
disaster aid because these firms are better equipped than governments and aid agencies to sense 
areas of need following a disaster, seize opportunities to respond, and reconfigure routines and 
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resources to do so. To wit, companies are likely to focus on rebuilding economic infrastructure 
and restoring market functions as soon as possible after a disaster, leading to faster aid provision 
and a stronger long-term recovery. We argued these effects would be amplified when responses 
leveraged firm-specific routines and resources. We tested our predictions using a proprietary 
dataset comprising information on every major natural disaster from 2003 to 2013, as well as 
each aid donation and its source. Synthetic control analysis, as well as a number of robustness 
checks, provided support for our predictions. Corporate disaster aid appears to be not only 
socially beneficial, but also more efficient and effective than aid from traditional providers.   
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Implications for corporate social responsibility research. Our study is relevant to 
debates about the social desirability and effectiveness of CSR. It is popular among management 
scholars to focus on the organizational implications of CSR, while inferring societal benefits. 
Some scholars considered it intrinsically good—and certainly better than the alternative—that 
companies are developing self-regulation standards (Prakash & Potoski, 2007), engaging in 
disaster responses (Madsen & Rogers, 2014), and contributing to the provision of public goods 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). This interpretation is open to critique, however, because societal 
outcomes are assumed rather than shown. Indeed, critics have argued there are inherent problems 
with these initiatives, largely because of their strategic nature (Marquis & Qian, 2013; Surroca et 
al., 2013). According to this view, firms use CSR primarily for symbolic and political purposes, 
rather than as a tool to deliver meaningful social benefits. This has led some to argue that efforts 
to enhance social welfare are best left to governments and aid agencies, and should not be ceded 
to corporations (Banerjee, 2008; Frynas, 2005).   
Our study is among the first to provide quasi-experimental evidence for the social value 
of CSR (Lyneis & Sterman, 2015; Wry, 2009). While our analysis does not focus on individual 
firms—and suggests that positive effects may only become evident when companies mount a 
large, collective effort—results suggest there are reasons to believe that strategic CSR is indeed 
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the win-win proposition that proponents suggest. Our approach assumes that corporate disaster 
aid is primarily strategic and self-interested (Henisz et al., 2014). Rather than symbolic responses 
and sub-optimal aid allocation, however, results suggest that firms are taking practical action to 
restore economic and market functioning (Ballesteros, 2015; Horowitz, 2008). As a result, when 
firms make a large collective contribution to relief efforts, the net effect is that aid arrives more 
quickly and a nation recovers more fully following a disaster. In turn, responding companies may 
benefit from buffering their own economic shocks while also currying favor among local 
stakeholders (Henisz et al., 2014; Madsen & Rogers, 2014). In this way, our findings raise 
interesting questions about the degree to which companies might benefit from CSR, not only as a 
firm-specific resource, but also through the creation of public or club goods (Ballesteros, 2015).  
Our approach also contributes to the CSR literature by showing that dynamic capabilities 
can be usefully applied to theorize about the relationship between corporate action and societal 
outcomes. Unlike studies that have used this framework to explain why CSR differs among firms 
(Ramachandran, 2011; Scherer et al., 2016), we followed research that has shown capabilities 
vary systemically among organizational forms (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Lampel & Shamsie, 
2003; Rindova et al., 2007). This allowed us to make theoretically informed predictions about 
the value of aid from corporations versus other types of organizations. Indeed, our argument and 
findings casts doubt on the notion that social welfare initiatives are always best left to public 
organizations (Banerjee, 2008; Sundram & Inkpen, 2004). To be clear, we are not suggesting 
these organizations are unimportant, but rather that locally active firms have motives and 
capabilities that enable them to contribute to disaster relief in uniquely valuable ways. 
However, by focusing on aggregate initiatives and outcomes, our approach points to a 
potential tension in the relationship between CSR that benefits society versus individual firms. 
We argue that society benefits when firms direct their capabilities toward a common goal.  Yet 
there is evidence that firms are incented to mount distinctive responses in order to capture private 
rents (Ramachandran, 2011; Teece, 2007). It will be important for future studies to identify 
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factors that predict coordination and cooperation in CSR initiatives, as opposed to idiosyncratic 
efforts or free-riding (Ostrom, 2000). In this way, our approach also highlights the importance of 
focusing on the collective level of analysis to understand the conditions under which CSR is 
most likely to yield societal benefits (Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 2013; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013; 
Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011; York, Hargrave, & Pacheco, 2016; Zhao & Wry, 2016).  
Also, while our predictions are context specific, the process of sensing, seizing, and 
reconfiguring is relevant to a broad range of CSR initiatives. This framework is also amenable to 
predicting both positive and negative outcomes, and should thus be useful for theorizing about 
the conditions under which corporate initiatives are more or less likely to contribute to desirable 
social outcomes. Indeed, while the dynamic capabilities of locally active companies appear to be 
conducive to fast and effective disaster responses, firms may not be as well suited to deal with 
other social issues. Of course, the efficacy of CSR may also differ among firms. We anticipate 
that future studies will apply dynamic capabilities at the firm level to make predictions about the 
variable effectiveness of CSR initiatives undertaken by different companies. Our analysis of 
related versus unrelated aid is a first step in this direction, and provides evidence in support of 
the argument that corporations create greater societal benefits when CSR leverages firm-specific 
competences (Kaul & Luo, 2015; Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2000).  
Implications for managers. Companies face growing calls not only to adopt social 
responsibilities, but also to demonstrate that their efforts in this regard are effective (Eccles et al., 
2014). Indeed, the benefits that a firm receives from CSR are blunted when stakeholders criticize 
its initiatives as being instrumental and symbolic (Frynas, 2005). As such, it is in a firm’s self-
interest to have objective data that show how its efforts affect outcomes of interest. Scholars 
have begun to develop tools for assessing the societal outcomes of public sector initiatives (e.g., 
Ebrahim 2003) but, as Frynas (2005: 276) notes, “linking CSR to development [goals] requires a 
new repertory of tools…by which such private interventions can be justified, planned, executed 
and evaluated.” Our study offers a first step in this direction by advancing an approach that uses 
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official data to empirically assess the social outcomes of corporate action. While this requires 
outcome data that is reliable and relevant to the aims of a focal initiative—and thus has some 
notable limitations—it nonetheless has the potential to help managers and other stakeholders 
more critically evaluate the social value of CSR. Such understanding may help firms maximize 
their social return on investment, while enhancing the strategic benefits of CSR initiatives. 
Our findings also have implications for corporate disaster responses. To this end, we 
show that disasters are an area where locally active firms have a comparative advantage over 
other organizations in contributing to social welfare. Moreover, these efforts appear to be 
enhanced when responses are fast and leverage firm-specific routines and resources. For 
managers, this suggests that there is value in delegating response decisions to local affiliates. It 
also highlights the value of engaging in responses that leverage a firm’s core expertise, as 
opposed to providing more general forms of aid (Kaul & Luo, 2015).  
Implications for disaster relief. While there is anecdotal evidence that disaster responses 
benefit from corporate involvement (e.g., Horowitz, 2008; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013; Useem et 
al., 2015), our study is the first to empirically model this relationship. Our findings point to an 
important role for locally active firms in disaster relief, but also key limitations. To the extent 
that corporate aid is motivated by a desire to restore market functions, our analysis suggests that 
a nation’s ability to recover from disasters may be related to the level of development and 
openness in its economy. Put another way, the small economic footprint of foreign and domestic 
companies in some nations likely makes corporate giving more a function of social preferences, 
and—given our argument about the conditions for a comparative advantage of the firm—less 
impactful for social welfare. Our approach also suggests that firms are more likely than 
traditional aid providers to engage in responses that are ancillary to their financial interests. 
There is a broad range of damages wrought by a disaster, and not all of these are equally relevant 
for a nation’s economic functioning. This suggests that 1) the practical contribution that 
companies make to effective disaster relief varies widely among nations, and 2) corporate 
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involvement is not panacea for all facets of disaster response. Thus, while firms can play a 
valuable role in disaster relief, this does not obviate the need for traditional aid providers.   
Limitations and Future Work 
In this study, we have started to elucidate the characteristics of corporate donors and their 
giving that may have implications for social welfare outcomes. Disaster relief is only one context 
where internal and external stakeholders ask firms to play a larger role, though, and caution 
should be taken when generalizing our findings. We anticipate that future studies will examine 
the influence of CSR for different social issues, and will develop context-specific predictions and 
findings. Such efforts will be important for generating a more robust and theoretically nuanced 
understanding of the relationship between corporate action and social welfare.   
Also, while our study strongly suggests that corporate aid is beneficial for disaster relief, 
important unresolved issues remain. For instance, our results suggest that beneficiaries are likely 
to receive in-kind goods more quickly than other types of donations, and that these are helpful 
for a nation’s disaster recovery. Yet disaster-management practitioners often ask for liquid 
resources because in-kind donations cannot be repurposed as needs evolve, and can burden or 
clog aid-delivery infrastructure (Fritz, 2004). Future studies should deepen our analysis and work 
to untangle these conflicting predictions. It may be useful here to examine the variable influence 
of different types of related resources. Some firms may have routines and resources that greatly 
benefit relief efforts, whereas it may be more beneficial for others to provide general resources. 
Further, to the extent that firms in some industries are better equipped to contribute to disaster 
responses, this type of analysis may also give insight into the relationship between a nation’s 
industrial demography and its recovery from disaster.  
Finally, while our analysis focused on isolating the value of aid from locally active firms, 
effective disaster relief requires coordination and cooperation amongst all responders (Cohen & 
Werker, 2008; Fritz, 2004). As such, the value of corporate aid may be shaped by interactions 
with other stakeholders, the extent to which aid decisions take into account these other providers, 
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and the degree to which donations are complementary versus redundant. These issues were 
beyond the scope of the current paper, but provide fruitful terrain for future research.  
CONCLUSION 
Addressing the hardship caused by sudden natural disasters is a grand challenge with 
implications for human misery and the economic functioning of both nations and corporations. 
As companies are increasingly being called upon to participate in response efforts, it is 
important to understand their ability to contribute to positive societal outcomes. Our findings 
suggest that firms with operations in an affected country have unique capabilities that allow 
them to sense areas of critical need, seize response opportunities, and reconfigure routines and 
resources to respond more quickly and effectively than traditional aid providers. As such, we not 
only demonstrate that strategic CSR can deliver meaningful societal benefits in some contexts, 
but that nations benefit greatly from corporate involvement when disaster strikes.       
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES mean sd min max 
Donation Amount (US Million) 9.09 46.26 .014 595.45 
GDP (PPP per capita) 13,730.17 14,179.09 388.20 62,571.35 
Human Development Index 0.31 0.35 0.00 0.94 
Human Hardship (deaths) 392.61 6,904.36 1.00 222,570.00 
Life Expectancy at Birth, total (years) 70.37 8.10 42.15 83.33 
Annual Number of  Disasters (Nation) 7.45 7.90 0.00 33.00 
Annual Number of  Disasters (Global) 237.78 16.71 213.00 260.00 
Newsworthy Events 8.90 2.57 2.83 29.25 
Salience  18.83 17.32 0.18 50.00 
Openness to Aid 35.37 18.16 0.12 137.97 
Estimated Damage (US Million) 1,163.80 8,175.15 0.01 210,000.00 
School Enrollment, Secondary,  (% net) 70.19 21.12 6.92 99.84 
Total Investment (ratio of total investment to GDP) 26.31 8.92 6.59 61.47 
Table 2. Correlations 
  VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Donation Amount (US Million) 1.00 
            
2 GDP (PPP per capita) 0.09 1.00 
           
3 Human Development Index 0.10 0.19 1.00 
          
4 Human Hardship (deaths) 0.20 -0.05 -0.03 1.00 
         
5 Life Expectancy at Birth, total (years) 0.05 0.79 0.24 -0.05 1.00 
        
6 Annual Number of  Disasters (Nation) 0.05 0.27 -0.17 0.05 -0.03 1.00 
       
7 Annual Number of  Disasters (Global) 0.01 -0.08 -0.20 -0.04 -0.09 0.02 1.00 
      
8 Newsworthy Events 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.10 -0.01 -0.08 1.00 
     
9 Salience 0.07 0.51 0.10 0.01 0.33 0.37 0.09 0.04 1.00 
    
10 Openness to Aid 0.07 0.57 0.07 0.02 0.44 0.41 0.08 0.01 0.93 1.00 
   
11 Estimated Damage (US Million) 0.58 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.03 -0.07 0.27 -0.11 0.12 1.00 
  
12 School Enrollment, Secondary,  (% net) 0.05 0.74 0.21 -0.06 0.85 -0.01 -0.06 0.11 -0.25 0.31 0.13 1.00 
 
13 Total Investment (ratio of total investment to GDP) 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.11 -0.12 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.07 1.00 
  
 
Table 3. The Effect of Giving from Locally Active Firms on Speed of Aid 
  
 Share of Aid from Locally Active Firms 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
7.7% 24.5% 44.4% 
Predictors Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control 
Size of the Economy 10782.72 11074.42 11677.95 11680.89 22236.14 22311.46 
Human Hardship  418.47 438.71 397.28 394.78 7515.66 6872.36 
Salience 15.07 16.33 17.12 17.24 25.21 23.89 
Disasters (Nation) 8.75 8.95 7.24 7.31 8.46 8.69 
Disasters (Global) 241.11 237.44 240.37 239.98 239.61 241.28 
Newsworthy Events 8.69 8.87 8.11 8.36 7.15 7.58 
Openness to Aid 0.79 0.82 0.89 0.86 0.68 0.71 
Estimated Damage  811.74 810.83 1025.42 1017.85 117176.74 99815.27 
Outcome Variable 
% of disaster aid 4 weeks  17.5 14.6 43.1 19.5 58.3 18.4 
p-value 0.234 0.006 0.000 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the disaster 
response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes the distance 
between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case basis.  
Treated are disaster countries with a substantial share of disaster giving coming from firms economically active in 
the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country 
disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 2,084. 
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Note: The outcome variable is the accumulated amount of disaster aid. Treated are disaster countries with a 
substantial share of disaster giving coming from firms economically active in the affected country (as defined by 
the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 2,084. 
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Table 4. The Effect of Giving from Locally Active Firms on Disaster Recovery 
 
Share of Aid from Locally Active 
Firms 
Model 4 
7.7% 
Model 5  
24.5% 
Model 6  
44.4% 
Predictors Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control 
School Enrollment 70.24 70.39 89.12 84.68 82.75 83.33 
Life Expectancy  70.11 71.25 80.44 79.98 76.95 75.48 
Inflation rate 2.58 3.15 1.99 2.01 1.44 2.54 
Trade openness 31.48 31.25 49.91 48.71 46.96 47.91 
Total Investment  23.14 24.19 20.74 21.14 19.66 19.84 
Estimated Damage 810.14 790.36 1008.74 1000.79 117176.74 98815.27 
Outcome Variable  
% of annual HDI growth  
(10th post-disaster year) 
0.95 0.84 0.48 0.25 0.54 0.22 
p-value  0.239 0.007 0.004 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the disaster 
response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes the distance 
between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case basis. Treated are 
disaster countries with a substantial share of disaster giving coming from firms economically active in the affected 
country (as defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country-year disasters in the 
period 2003-2013 is 464. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Note: Instead of showing absolute values, the figure shows the difference in HDI growth rate between treatment nations and correspondent synthetic controls for 
15 years before the disaster and 10 years after the disaster. Period (0) is the disaster year. No sizeable effects before the disaster year suggest that the synthetic 
control method has generated efficient control nations. Treated are disaster countries with a substantial share of disaster giving coming from firms economically 
active in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country-year disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 464. 
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Table 5. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from Locally Active Firms and Speed of Aid 
 
Share of Aid  
from 
 Locally Active 
Firms 
7.7% 24.5% 44.4% 
Relatedness of 
Corporate Aid 
Model 7                                                                           
11.5% 
Model 8                                 
26.9% 
Model 9                                   
42.4% 
Model 10                                      
11.5% 
Model 11                                 
26.9% 
Model 12                                                                  
42.4% 
Model 13                             
11.5% 
Model 14                                                        
26.9% 
Model 15                                                         
42.4% 
Predictors T C T C T C T C T C T C T C T C T C 
Size of 
 the Economy 
785.6 700.5 15845.4 15511.7 17890.4 16998.2 2748.4 2478.5 17864.3 17448.8 50711.8 49788.2 0.0 0.0 7412.1 7314.1 29648.2 29008.4 
Human  
Hardship  
1025.4 1031.7 994.3 987.4 380.7 380.2 847.6 888.3 236.8 236.2 348.5 347.3 0.0 0.0 6125.3 6785.2 8211.7 8305.5 
Salience 11.7 11.9 15.0 15.4 18.3 18.4 16.8 16.7 24.6 25.1 25.9 24.8 0.0 0.0 21.7 22.2 35.1 30.5 
Disasters 
 (Nation) 
8.3 8.3 8.8 7.6 8.8 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.3 7.2 7.5 7.4 0.0 0.0 9.0 9.1 9.8 9.7 
Disasters 
 (Global) 
289.1 289.9 240.4 229.7 240.8 222.0 310.1 309.7 248.4 247.7 239.4 239.6 0.0 0.0 211.3 215.4 240.9 241.3 
Newsworthy  
Events 
8.2 8.2 8.2 8.0 8.5 7.2 8.3 8.5 7.4 7.3 8.0 8.6 0.0 0.0 6.1 6.8 7.1 7.1 
Openness to Aid 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.6 
Estimated 
 Damage  
557.6 553.8 810.8 799.1 811.0 756.4 739.2 736.6 976.5 981.5 1008.7 1000.8 0.0 0.0 11594.5 11587.5 169974.6 167857.4 
Outcome Variable 
% of disaster aid, 
first four weeks 
11.6 10.6 15.4 13.3 18.8 15.5 30.7 11.4 38.4 16.7 46.8 23.8 NA NA 48.7 17.6 63.2 17.0 
p-value 0.470 0.225 0.209 0.030 0.004 0.001 NA 0.002 0.000 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic 
control algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case basis. Treated are disaster countries with a 
substantial in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core operation coming from firms economically active in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff 
points). The total sample of country disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 2,084 
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Note: The outcome variable is the accumulated amount of disaster aid for the first four post-disaster weeks. Treated are disaster 
countries with at least 42.4% of in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core operation coming from firms economically active in 
the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points).  The sample for the period 2003-2013 is 2,084 disasters. 
  
 
 
 
Table 6. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from Locally Active Firms and Recovery 
Share of Aid 
from 
 Locally 
Active Firms 
7.70% 24.50% 44.40% 
Relatedness of 
Corporate Aid 
Model 16 
11.50% 
Model 17 
26.90% 
Model 18 
42.40% 
Model 19 
11.50% 
Model 20 
26.90% 
Model 21 
 42.40% 
Model 22 
11.50% 
Model 23 
 26.90% 
Model 24  
42.40% 
Predictors  T C T C T C T C T C T C T C T C T C 
School 
Enrollment 
63.11 64.85 69.72 70.02 71.98 71.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 89.12 84.68 0.00 0.00 65.14 66.05 91.55 90.14 
Life 
Expectancy 
67.15 67.89 68.57 67.39 72.51 73.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.44 79.98 0.00 0.00 68.71 69.14 81.07 82.17 
Inflation rate 5.69 6.11 4.56 4.78 3.39 3.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.99 2.01 0.00 0.00 2.93 2.68 0.69 1.25 
Trade openness 21.36 22.18 28.67 28.11 34.78 32.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 49.91 48.71 0.00 0.00 27.91 26.87 57.21 57.36 
Total Investment 15.4 15.68 19.75 19.84 26.34 27.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.74 21.14 0.00 0.00 19.66 18.76 21.6 20.7 
Estimated 
Damage 
557.64 553.81 810.76 799.13 811.01 756.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1008.74 1000.79 0.00 0.00 11594.47 11587.47 169974.58 97994.17 
Outcome Variable 
% of HDI 
annual 
growth, end of 
10th year  
1.47 1.48 0.96 0.97 0.89 0.72 NA NA NA NA 0.48 0.25 NA NA 0.52 .24 0.55 0.19 
p-value  0.374 0.317 0.224 NA NA 0.007 NA 0.005 0.002 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the 
synthetic control algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case basis. Treated are disaster 
countries with a substantial in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core operation coming from firms economically active in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 
24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country-year disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 464. 
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Figure 4. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from Locally Active Firms and 
Recovery 
S
h
a
re
 o
f 
g
iv
in
g
 f
ro
m
 l
o
ca
ll
y
 a
ct
iv
e 
fi
rm
s 
7
.7
%
 
 
2
4
.5
%
 
 
4
4
.4
%
 
 
Note: The outcome variable is the annual growth rate of HDI. Treated are disaster countries with at least 42.4% of in-kind giving that 
is related to the donor’s core operation coming from firms economically active in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, 
and 44.4% cutoff points).  Each figure shows the difference between the annual growth rates of HDI for treated and control nations 15 
years before the disaster and 10 years after the disaster. The total sample of country-year disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 464.
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